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RECENT CASES
Civil Rights-Federal Criminal Code Protects Rights
Secured by Fourteenth Amendment
Defendants were indicted by a federal grand jury' for conspiring
to interfere with the civil rights of several Negro citizens in violation
of the federal criminal code. 2 The district court dismissed the indictments on grounds that they alleged a violation of general rights
secured by the fourteenth amendment, rather than specific rights
"secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States" as the
statute required. 3 On direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court, held, reversed. Section 241 of the federal criminal code prohibits violations of all rights and privileges secured by the Constitution
or laws of the United States, including the right to travel interstate
and those rights and privileges guaranteed by the due process and
equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment. United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
The principal problem in applying section 241 of the federal criminal
code is in determining whether the particular civil rights involved
are protected either by the Constitution or by the laws of the United
States within the meaning of that section. Since section 241 contains no
reference to state action, it was held in United States v. Williams4 to
1. The indictment charged that defendants conspired to "injure, oppress, threaten,
and intimidate" Negroes in the free exercise of certain rights, including: (1) the
right to equal use of public facilities managed by the State of Georgia; (2) the right
to full and equal use of Georgia's public streets and highways; and (3) the right to
travel freely upon the facilities and instrumentalities of interstate commerce within
Georgia. The indictments further alleged that the conspiracy achieved these violations
by shooting, beating, threatening, and killing Negroes, and by causing their arrest
by false accusations to state authorities. For the full indictment, see United States v.
Guest, 383 U.S. 745, at 747-48 n.1.
2. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1664) [hereinafter cited as § 241). "If two or more
persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free
exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same; or
"If two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another,
with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege
so secured"They shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years,
or both."
3. United States v. Guest, 246 F. Supp. 475, 483-84 (M.D. Ga. 1964).
4. 341 U.S. 70 (1951). See also United States v. Guest, supra note 3. The
restriction of § 241 to private interference would have precluded prosecutions for the
violation of rights under the fourteenth amendment, since the equal protection and
due process clauses apply only where state action is involved. See 54 Nw. U.L. REv.
616, 620 (1960). In further distinguishing rights protected under § 241 from those
not so protected, the Court in Williams held that the section prohibits violations of
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reach only violations of those specific rights and privileges which the
federal government may protect from interference by private individuals. The right to travel freely from state to state is such a
right, either as an incident of national citizenship5 or because the
commerce clause pre-empts state regulation in the area.6 However,
another line of cases established that section 241, or its similar
predecessor,7 was not applicable to private interferences with fourteenth amendment rights,8 since section 5 of that amendment 9 empowered Congress to act only within the scope of the rest of the
amendment, which spoke only of state actions.' 0 In the words of the
Court in The Civil Rights Cases,
. . . the last section of the amendment invests Congress with power to
enforce it by appropriate legislation. To enforce what? To enforce the
prohibition. To adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of
such prohibited State law and State acts, and thus to render them effectually
null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon
Congress, and this is the whole of it. 11

Furthermore, the Court has held that rights secured under the due
process and equal protection clauses are not included under section
241 because such inclusion would render the section invalid due to
rights which are substantive, but not those which are remedial. Substantive rights
are those which are granted in the specific language of the Constitution or statutes
(or necessarily and properly implied therefrom), such as the right to petition Congress
for redress of grievances, United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875), to be
protected from violence while in the lawful custody of a United States marshal,
Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892), or the right to travel freely from state
to state, discussed in the text above. Remedial rights, on the other hand, are those
which are protected against infringement by state action under the fourteenth amendment, which would presumably include protection against illegal search and seizure,
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the right against self-incrimination, Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), and the right to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
5. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
6. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941). Note that the negative implications
of the commerce clause have no reference to prohibitions of state action under the
fourteenth amendment. Thus,' the Court, using this approach, found congressional
authority to affect private persons in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000a. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
7. "That if two or more persons . . . shall conspire together, or go in disguise upon
the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose . . . of depriving
any person
. of the equal protection- of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities
under the laws, . . . [they] shall be deemed guilty of a high crime

....

"

Civil

Rights Act of 1871 § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14.
8. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
9. "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 5.
10. 'Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S: 339 (1879);
United States v. Cruikshank, supra note 4.
11. Supra note 10, at 11.
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vagueness. 1 2 This latter construction was based upon the reasoning
that rights protected by section 241 must be sufficiently definite to
place potential violators on notice as to the acts prohibited by that
section. Since both equal protection and due process are vague terms

which may not be clearly defined13judicially, they were held to be
outside the purview of the statute.

The Guest case was decided in conjunction with United States v.

Price.14 Noting that Price had held that those rights protected by

section 241 included rights under the due process clause, the Court
found that rights under the equal protection clause are included as
well, thus bringing all fourteenth amendment rights under section
241. For a violation of section 241 to exist, there must be both a
specific intent to interfere with the civil rights of a citizen of the
United States and specific rights, the violation of which may be

prosecuted. The Court found that the requirement of a specific intent
is met by the very nature of section 241, since proof of the conspiracy required under that section would necessarily include proof
of the requisite specific intent. 15 The requirement of the existence of
a specific right also presented no serious difficulty, since a long line
of prior decisions has firmly and precisely established specific rights
protected by the fourteenth amendment. 16 Such judicial specificity
12. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). For this proposition of the
vagueness and its relation to the constitutionality of § 241, the district court in the
instant case also relied upon United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951). But
the Supreme Court pointed out in the companion case of United States v. Price, 383
U.S. 787, 798 (1966), that in Williams the question was left open by an even split of
the Court.
13. See materials cited in note 4 supra.
14. Supra note 12. Price also involved alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1964),
which prescribes the penalty for violations, under color of state law, of rights under
the due process clause. "Under color of any law" has been construed to include
positive acts involving state officials, such as violent extortion of confessions from
prisoners by prison officials, United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953),
and the beating to death of a prisoner by a sheriff, Clark v. United States, 193 F.2d
294 (5th Cir. 1951), as well as passive acts, or inaction, in the face of the duty to
act affirmatively, such as permitting members of the Ku Klux Klan to remove prisoners
from jail and beat them, Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951), and
a sheriff's removing his badge to indicate divestnent of official role in subsequent
beating to death of a prisoner, Crews v. United States, 160 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1947).
15. The specific intent requirement had also caused difficulty in prosecutions under
§ 242, supra note 14. In the leading case of Screws v. United States, supra note 12,
the Court held that § 242 could be constitutionally upheld only if the statute were
read to require a showing of specific intent to deprive the victim of civil rights, with
the result that prosecution was made more difficult. See 1961 U.S. COrNIN'N ON CIvIL
RiraiTs REP. 45-67; Note, 65 HAnv. L. Ruv. 107, 138 (1951); Note, 74 YALEL.J. 1297 (1965). However, once state involvement was found, even private persons
who joined state officers in the violations could be prosecuted under § 241, in
conjunction with the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1964).
16. For the Court's citations to cases specifying these rights under the equal
protection clause, see 383 U.S. at 754 n.6.
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eliminated any argument that the section might be unconstitutionally
vague if interpreted as enforcing rights secured by the fourteenth
amendment. But in expanding the rights included under section 241,
the Court stressed that the section "incorporates no more than the
Equal Protection Clause itself." 17 Furthermore, while reasserting that
rights under the equal protection clause are protected only from state
action, the Court pointed out that the actual involvement of the state
need not be either exclusive or direct. It therefore concluded that
the allegation that defendants caused the arrest of Negroes by making
false accusations to authorities 8 indicated a possibility of sufficient
state involvement to require denial of a motion to dismiss this paragraph of the indictment.' 9 The Court next considered the district
court's dismissal of that paragraph of the indictment alleging that
defendants had conspired to interfere with the rights of Negroes to
travel freely and to use the facilities of interstate commerce. Reviewing earlier decisions 20 concerned with the right to free travel, the
Court found that right to be secured by the Constitution, and, therefore, within the purview of section 241. In a separate opinion, Mr.
Justice Brennan dissented from that portion of the majority holding
which he interpreted as requiring state action for application of section
241 to discriminatory practices. He maintained that enforcement of
section 241 should not require a showing of state action, since in
passing the section Congress had exercised the power granted by
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment "to enforce the provision of
this article." Arguing that the provision of section 241 requiring that
rights be "secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States"
is met if the provision in question "arises under [or] is dependent
upon" the fourteenth amendment, he concluded that Congress had
proscribed all interferences with constitutional rights, be they stateconnected or private. 21 Mr. Justice Harlan also dissented, finding
17. Id. at 754. Although the Court is unclear as to the meaning of this statement,
it would appear to suggest that rights which are considered remedial, or protected
against state action by the fourteenth amendment, are not automatically implemented
by § 241 as are substantive rights, but must await a case-by-case determination and
application.
18. See note 1 supra.
19. It must be kept in mind that the instant case was never tried, but rather was
dismissed in the district court for insufficiency of the indictment. The Court here is
only ruling on that dismissal.
20. See Crandall v. Nevada, supra note 5 and accompanying text; Edwards v.
California, supra note 6.
21. 383 U.S. at 781. Mr. Justice Clark, in a separate opinion joined by Justices Black
and Fortas, would seem to agree, at least in result. He contended that "there now
can be no doubt that the specific language of § 5 [of the fourteenth amendment]
empowers the Congress to enact laws punishing all conspiracies-with or without state
action-that interfere with Fourteenth Amendment rights." Id. at 762. (Emphasis
added.)
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that although the right to travel freely from state to state has been
established in previous cases, those holdings dealt with unreasonable
governmental interference. He thought that the right to free travel
should be incorporated in the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment, but he indicated that since due process protects individuals only from governmental action, the violation of that right in Guest
by individuals was not within the protection of section 241.
The most significant aspects of the instant case lie in the implications of the various opinions of the Justices rather than in the actual
holding. While the Court reaffirmed the established proposition that
state action is required for application of the fourteenth amendment,
it indicated that if any state connection with the violation can be
found, there will be sufficient grounds to sustain an indictment under
section 241. Since there was at least a possibility of state action in
Guest, the majority was able to avoid the question of whether strictly
private interferences with civil rights might be reached through section
241 and the fourteenth amendment. However, Justices Clark and
Brennan spoke directly to this question in their separate opinions.
Both noted that Congress could certainly prohibit such private interferences, under the authority given it in section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment to enact "appropriate legislation" for enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment 2 Since each opinion was joined by two other
Justices,2 six votes supported this proposition. Assuming that these
six Justices will continue to support this line of thought, the implications of Guest could be of paramount significance in the area of federal
civil rights. First, the separate opinions raise considerable doubt as
to the current validity of the Civil Rights Cases.4 Congress apparently
still accepted these early rulings in 1964, since the Civil Rights Act
of that year was based primarily upon the power of Congress to
legislate under the commerce clause5 This fact is significant in that
the 1964 Act was virtually the same in its application to public accommodations as the Civil Rights Act of 187526 which the Court had
22. Id. at 762, 782. Mr. Justice Brennan argued further that § 241 is itself such
an enactment.
23. Mr. Justice Clark was joined by Justices Black and Fortas. The Chief Justice

and Mr. Justice Douglas joined Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion.
24. Supra note 10. These cases have never been expressly overruled by the Court.

25. "Each of the following establishments which serves the public is a place of public
accommodation within the meaning of this subchapter if its operations affect cmnmerce
....
" (Emphasis added.) The places of public accommodation included are inns,
hotels, or motels which provide lodging for transient guests, eating places, and places
of entertainment. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 243, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a(b).

26. 18 Stat. 335 (1875). -The act provided "That all persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or
water, theatres, and other places of public amusement .

. . ."

18 Stat. 336 (1875).
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held unconstitutional when based upon the fourteenth amendment. 7
When the validity of the 1964 act was questioned in Heart of Atlanta
and Ollie's Barbecue,29 the Court based its decisions, upholding the
act, completely upon the commerce clause; yet in both of these cases,
it seemed to be stretching to find a connection between interstate
commerce and the statute.30 Under the commerce clause alone, it is
probable that the Court would have had considerable difficulty in
finding a sufficient effect upon interstate commerce to enable Congress
to enact the housing section of the pending 1966 act.31 However, if
the Court should follow the reasoning of Mr. Justice Brennan in
Guest, Congress would be empowered to enact both the 1964 act and
the proposed 1966 act through section 5 of the fourteenth amendment
without having to rely on some tenuous connection with commerce.
In fact, Congress seems already to have accepted the implications of
the separate opinions by failing to mention any required connection
with commerce in the proposed 1966 act. However, the Court would
still have to find that Congress had a rational basis for determining
that the prohibition of discrimination by individuals is an appropriate
means of preventing discrimination by states.
Completely aside from the broadened scope of possible future congressional legislation which was affected by Guest, the expansion of
section 241 to include violations of fourteenth amendment rights may
have significant implications under existing laws. This decision suggests a willingness to bring within the purview of the federal civil
rights conspiracy statute those rights which might be considered more
sophisticated than rights formerly included by the case law. Previous
prosecutions under section 241 usually involved cases of extreme
brutality and violence, 32 which readily met the requirement of a
specific intent to violate a right secured by the Constitution or by
statutes.- Since the Court had held that any less specific showing
27. Civil Rights Cases, supra note 10.
28. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, supra note 6.
29. Katzenbach v. McClung, Supra note 6.
30. In Katzenbach v. MeClung, supra note 6, the relation to commerce was the
food bought and served, which food had traveled in interstate commerce (or at least
some of it had so traveled). The Court admitted, "It goes without saying that,
viewed in isolation, the volume of food purchased by Ollie's Barbecue from sources
supplied from out of state was insignificant when compared with the total foodstuffs
moving in commerce." Id. at 300-01.
31. H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. tit. IV (1966). "It shall be unlawful for any
person . . . To refuse to sell . . . a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
(Emphasis added.) H.R. 14765, 89th Cong., 2d
religion, or national origin .....
Sess. § 403 (1966).
32. See cases cited in note 14 supra.
33. See 1961 U.S. COM'XN oN CrviL Rwros REP. 45-67. For example, it would

not be difficult to show prior knowledge of the illegality of the act of killing another
person. In such cases, the intent to violate a civil right of the victim is almost a
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of intent would render the section void for vagueness, prosecutors
were restricted to only the most blatent violationsY' But in discussing
some of the specific rights included under the fourteenth amendment,
and presumably now under section 241, the majority in the instant
case cited decisions involving integration of public facilities, 35 as contrasted with cases involving beating of prisoners, 36 the extortion of
confessions,3 or the violent treatment of unwanted canvassers. 38 This
emphasis upon the less violent civil rights cases, when considered
in conjunction with the argument for inclusion of due process and
equal protection among those rights protected by section 241, would
seem to indicate that prosecutions under this section will now be
more numerous. These results could follow, even if the Court in the
future should go no further than the actual holding of Guest.
A third immediate implication of the instant case, without reference
to the separate opinions, is its possible effect upon application of the
civil counterpart to section 241, which gives a victim of civil rights
violations a cause of action for damages against the violator. Since
this civil provision is similar in wording to section 241,31 its development has closely paralleled that of its criminal counterpart. 40 In fact,
the courts seem to consider holdings in both the criminal prosecutions
and the civil actions when deciding either type of case. 41 This practice
has led to considerable confusion in the civil cases, where, for example,
violations of equal protection rights give rise to a cause of action
while denials of due process do not.42 If this parallelism in the
interpretation of the civil and criminal sections continues, it would
follow that the victim of any rights violation would now have a
cause of action against the violator. This possibility is particularly
foregone conclusion. However, proof of a prior intent to violate the victim's right
to due process of law would be substantially more difficult, especially since even the
Supreme Court has had difficulty in deciding just what would constitute such a
violation.
34. 1961 U.S. CoMM'N oN CrviL RIGHTs REP. 45-67.

35.
36.
37.
38.

383 U.S. at 754 n.6.
Clark v. United States, supra note 14.
United States v. Jones, supra note 14.
Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).

39. "If two or more persons . . . conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on
the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving . . . any person . . . of the equal

protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws . . .
whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of . . . any right or
privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have
an action for the recovery of damages .... ." 12 Stat. 284 (1861) (amended by 17
Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) (1964).
40. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
41. Compare United States v. Jones, supra note 14, with Lewis v. Brautigam, 227
F.2d 124 (5th Cir. 1955).
42. Compare Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951), with Lewis v. Brautigam,
supra note 41.
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significant in light of some of the recent decisions reversing convictions based upon evidence obtained by local and state authorities in
violation of the fourth, fifth and sixth amendments, as applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. 43 Furthermore, these
civil actions would be relatively easy to institute, since no diversity
of citizenship or jurisdictional amount is necessary for access to the
federal courts.44 Thus, unless some further decision of the Court
dictates otherwise, the instant case may serve as a basis both for
broadening federal legislative involvement in all areas of civil rights,
and for an increasing line of criminal and civil actions aimed toward
the vindication of these same rights.

Civil Rights-Removal-Strict Interpretation of
Federal Removal Statute Affirmed
Defendants were arrested and indicted under the Georgia antitrespass statute' in the spring of 1963 when they tried to obtain service
at privately owned restaurants open to the general public in Atlanta,
Georgia. The defendants petitioned the federal district court for
removal of the cases under the civil rights removal statute.. The
district court's denial of removal was reversed by the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. 3 On certiorari to the United States Supreme
43. See cases cited in note 4 supra. See also Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1963).
44. Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 1954).
1. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-3005 (Cum.Supp. 1965): "Refusal to leave premises of
another when ordered to do so by owner or person in charge.-It shall be unlawful
for any person, who is on the premises of another, to refuse and fail to leave said
premises when requested to do so by the owner or any person in charge of said
premises ...."

2. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1964): "Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district
court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place wherein it
is pending:
(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State
a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United
States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal
rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with
such law."
3. Rachel v. Georgia, 342 F.2d 336 (5th Cir. 1965). The court held that because of
state legislation the appellants bad been denied the right of immunity from state trespass
prosecutions guaranteed under the public accommodations sections of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, §§ 201-03, 78 Stat. 243-44, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-2, as interpreted
in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
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Court, held, affirmed. Removal of a case to a federal court is warranted
because pending state prosecutions forbidden by a federal civil rights
law lead to a clear prediction that defendants' civil rights will be
denied. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
The removal provision4 was upheld as constitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in 18805 in Strauder v. West Virginia.6 Strauder
further held that the West Virginia statute excluding Negroes from
jury service was a sufficient denial of petitioner's equal rights to
warrant removal under the statute. 7 On the same day that Strauder
was decided, however, the Court in Virginia v. RivesO denied a petition
for removal based on a similar jury' exclusion question. Since no state
statute specifically excluded Negroes from jury duty, the Court held
that petitioner had not shown the inevitable denial of rights essential
to the granting of removal.9 In Neal v. Delaware,° the Court upheld
the denial of a removal petition on the ground that petitioner had
failed to show that the alleged jury exclusion was sanctioned either
by state statute or constitutional provision." This stringent requirement of a statutory denial of rights was affirmed in a series of Supreme
Court cases from 1881 to 1906.12 With the notable exception of the
4. Since the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt only with questions arising under
28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1964), the Supreme Court confined its review to that subsection.
Rachel, 384 U.S. at 788.
5. The statute was then REv. STAT. § 641 (1875). The minor modifications in the
provision since that time have not changed either the language or the concept of a
defendant "who is denied or cannot enforce" a right secured "under any law providing
for equal civil rights."
6. 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (a Negro indicted for murder).
7. The Court pointed specifically to § 1977 of the Revised Statutes (now 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 (1964)) as a "law providing for equal civil rights" which would inevitably be
denied by an application of the discriminatory state jury statute.
8. 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
9. The Court held that the petitioner's apprehension that his rights would be denied
at trial was not a sufficient ground for the required affirmation of an inevitable denial.
10. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
11. It was held that since the alleged discrimination did not result from either the
state's laws or its constitution, it could not possibly be made manifest until after the
action had commenced in the state court, thus precluding pre-trial removal. Although
removal was denied, the Court did find evidence of grand jury discrimination and
reversed the conviction.
12. With one exception, all of these cases concerned allegations of systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries. In Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110 (1883), the required
discriminatory statute had been repealed before petitioner's indictment, thus precluding
the kind of predictability essential for removal. In Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
565 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); and Murray v. Louisiana,
163 U.S. 101 (1896), murder convictions were affirmed and removal denials sustained
because of failure to show direct, statutory or constitutional denial of rights. In
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213 (1898), petitioner for removal alleged discriminatory origin, application and administration of the state's laws and constitution, but
failed to convince the Court that such claims assured a denial of his rights at trial.
In its most recent interpretation of the removal statute, the Court in Kentucky v.
Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906), refused removal of a case in which the exclusion of

19661

RECENT CASES

Fifth Circuit,13 the lower federal courts have consistently followed
this line of authority. 14 Prior to the instant case the Court has had
little opportunity to re-examine its interpretations of the statute since
appeal of remand orders in removal cases was not authorized until
the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.15
The Court in Rachel first discussed the legislative history and
development of the provision. Dealing initially with the nature of the
"right" referred to in the removal statute, the Court concluded that
the provision protected only a specific right of racial equality conRepublicans from juries was alleged to be due to the corrupt acts of administrative
officials unauthorized by the laws or constitution of the state.
13. In Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1965), the court
distinguished the earlier Supreme Court decisions on the ground that they were
limited to cases involving the question of systematic jury exclusion, as opposed to
those involving the arrest and charging process. The court then proceeded to broaden
the scope of the removal statute by allowing removal for civil rights workers arrested
for obstructing a street. The significance of the decision lies in the fact that the
alleged denial of equal rights did not appear with certainty either on the face of
the statute or in its application in the arresting and charging process. The court felt
that the allegations of harassment and intimidation of voter registration by means
of the arrest warranted a hearing in the federal district court since convictions under
the statute, if applied as alleged, would violate the equal protection clause. A short
time later, in Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1965), the court allowed
removal in the case of a Negro minister charged with attempting to obstruct justice
by demonstrating near the court house. The charge was filed just after the Supreme
Court had reversed the same defendant's conviction for the substantive offense of
obstructing justice which arose out of the same court house demonstration. Cox v.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). Again, the relevant state statute was neither invalid
on its face nor in its application, but the defendant's allegations that he was charged
for reasons of racial discrimination were held to be sufficient to warrant removal. The
court summarized its holdings in Peacock and Cox: "The defendants, as a result of
their actions in advocating civil rights, are being prosecuted under statutes, valid on
... 348 F.2d
their face, for conduct protected by federal constitutional guarantees.
750, 754-55.
14. See, eg., Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1965) (prosecutions
of civil rights workers for violating state court injunction not removable); City:of
Chester v. Anderson, 347 F.2d 823 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam) (allegations of
public hostility and precipitous trial not grounds for removal); New York v. Galamison,
342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977 (1965) (city hall and traffic-blocking sit-in prosecutions not removable).
In addition to following the Strauder-Rives interpretation, Galamison (Friendly, J.)
explicitly states what the Supreme Court's interpretations of the removal statute had
strongly implied, namely, that "When the removal statute speaks of 'any law providing
for equal rights,' it refers to those laws that are couched in terms of equality, such
as the historic and the recent equal rights statutes, as distinguished from laws, of
which the due process clause and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are sufficient examples, that confer
equal rights in the sense, vital to our way of life, of bestowing them upon all.". 342
F.2d at 271. For a vigorous challenge to this view, see Amsterdam, Criminal
Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Federal Removal, and
Habeas Corpus JurisdictionTo Abort.State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. lEv. 793, 863-74
(1965).
15. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 901, 78 Stat. 266, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d)
(1964), expressly authorized appellate review of remand orders in removal cases.
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ferred by law. 16 It then decided that the defendants' right to obtain
service at public accommodations without fear of prosecution was a
right under section 201(a) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 17 and that
defendants were being denied that right by virtue of the pending
prosecutions in the courts of Georgia. In reaching this conclusion, the

Court saw the Strauder-Rives doctrine as requiring that a clearly
predictable denial of rights be made manifest in a formal expression

of state law. Applying the Strauder-Rives rule to the facts of Rachel,
it held that any trespass proceedings against the defendants in the
state court would constitute a denial of rights conferred by the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.18 The Court concluded that to refuse

removal would be to allow a denial of the defendants' right to be
free from prosecution for a protected activity. This denial in the

state court was held to be clearly predictable and to stem directly
from what would be an unconstitutional application of state law.19
The Court's decision in Rachel is closely in line with most authority
on the removal issue. Its tightly restrictive interpretation of the
statute necessarily follows from adherence to the spirit of the StrauderRives principles. However, the Court was not forced to go beyond
the Strauder-Rives statutory interpretation since the facts permitted
it to reach the desired result while remaining within this restricted
framework. Yet a slight factual variation within a similar civil rights
situation could produce an entirely different result, as demonstrated
by the Court's decision in City of Greenwood v. Peacock,20 handed
down on the same day as Rachel. In Greenwood, the defendants were
charged with obstructing a street, an offense which was not prohibited
16. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792. In its extended examination of the present § 1443,
the Court traced its origin to the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
Although the phrase, "any law providing for . . . equal civil rights" did not appear
in this initial provision, removal was to be allowed only in cases involving the rights
of racial equality guaranteed in the first section of the act. The language of § 1443
first appeared in REv. STAT. § 641 (1875), the specific provision interpreted by the
Supreme Court in all previous cases. After 1875 the removal statute underwent
only minor modification, leading the Court in the instant case to say: ". . . [F]or the
purposes of the present case, we are dealing with the same statute that confronted
the Court in the cases interpreting § 641." Rachel, 384 U.S. at 802.
17. 78 Stat. 243 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1964): "All persons shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages,
and accommodations of any place of public accommodation, as defined in this section,
without discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national
origin." § 203 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 244, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2,
forbids prosecution for exercising the rights guaranteed by § 201(a).
18. The Court cited Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306 (1964), for its
holding that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 immunized from prosecution attempts to
gain admittance to establishments covered by the Act. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 804.
19. Although the Georgia anti-trespass statute is neither discriminatory nor unconstitutional on its face, its application to defendants in the instant case automatically
results in the denial of rights required for removal.
20. 384 UJ.S. at 808.
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from prosecution under a federal civil rights law; they had chosen a
public street instead of a public accommodation as a forum for their
protest and were thus denied removal of their cases. 21 A key concern
underlying the decisions in both cases is that a broader interpretation
of the removal statute would bring about a "wholesale dislocation of
the historic relationship between the state and the federal courts in
the administration of the criminal law."22 But it seems unlikely that
this broader interpretation would have such a substantial effect on the
federal-state relationship if it is limited to cases involving harassment
proceedings against civil rights workers. In any case, an application
of the statute to allow removal under the facts in Greenwood would
have been a logical extension of the Strauder-Rives principles. Although the right would not be directly related to a civil rights law,
and the denial of it not so clearly predictable as in Rachel, the
requirement of firm evidence of a prospective denial of rights could
have been met.23 The Court's refusal to broaden its interpretation,
however, is curious in light of its active role in recent years in the
judicial promotion of equal civil rights. It is not unlikely that the
Greenwood decision will produce a "chilling effect on a federal
guarantee of civil rights"2 as Negroes and civil rights workers are
forced to turn to excessively time-consuming and cumbersome
21. Reversing the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the Court held that civil
rights workers arrested for obstructing traffic, disturbing the peace, and parading without
a permit were not entitled to removal of their cases under § 1443. The Court further
held that the defendants failed to show a right conferred by a law providing for equal
rights, a right which would be predictably denied in the state court. The Court distinguished Rachel from Greenwood on this point by acidly noting that the only right
allegedly denied to the defendants in the latter case was the right "to obstruct a public
street, to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to drive an automobile without a
license, or to bite a policeman." Id. at 826-27.
22. Id. at 831. Similarly, the Rachel decision spoke of the possible involvement of
"federal judges in the unseemly process of pre-judging their brethren of the state courts."
Rachel, 384 U.S. at 803-04. The Greenwood dissent (Douglas, J.) speaks to these
apprehensions: "The district judge could not lightly assume that the state court would
shirk its responsibilities, and should remand the case to the state court unless it
appeared by clear and convincing evidence that the allegations of an inability to
enforce equal civil rights were true." Greenwood, 384 U.S. at 852.
23. The basic elements for federal removal were present in Greenwood, i.e., both
the right (to be free from interference as provided by the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
79 Stat. 443, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(i)(b) (1964)) and the probable denial of that right
(by prosecution for "disorderly conduct" and "breach of the peace"). The only
element lacking was the clear inevitability of the denial, a requirement which the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not see as essential to removal. Nor can
it be seriously contended that the only way to allow removal in, Greenwood would
have been to overrule the Strauder-Rives line of authority. In fact, the Court's decision
in Rachel went beyond the stricter requirement of a facially unconstitutional state
statute as the instrument of the denial and ruled that the unconstitutional application
of that statute was sufficient. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 804.
24. Greenwood, 384 U.S. at 845 (dissent).
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remedies25 in order to vindicate rights denied by harassment prosecutions in state courts.

Labor Law-Judicial Review of Arbitrator's Authority
To Imply Contractual Condition
The Torrington Company unilaterally discontinued its policy of
allowing workers time off with pay to vote on election day,' a
practice it had unilaterally instituted twenty years earlier. The collective bargaining agreement in effect at the time the policy was
discontinued did not include such a provision. 2 When negotiations
for the current collective bargaining agreement began, both the
company and the union proposed continuing the existing contract,
but each suggested certain specific amendments. The voting benefit
policy was not included in the discussions, 3 and no provision in the
adopted agreement referred to the voting benefit. Just prior to election
day the company restated its decision to discontinue its former policy,
and the union filed a grievance which was submitted to arbitration
under the arbitration provisions of the new contract.4 The arbitrator
25. Among the remedies suggested: direct review by the Supreme Court, injunction,
habeas corpus, civil sanctions against state officers. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 829-30. The
Greenwood dissent answers this argument by stating: "These defendants' federal civil
rights may, of course, ultimately be vindicated if they persevere, live long enough,
and have the patience and the funds to carry their cases for some years through the
state courts to this Court. But it was precisely that burden that Congress undertook
to take off the backs of this persecuted minority and all who espouse the cause of
their equality." Greenwood, 384 U.S. at 854.
1. The company indicated that the decision to terminate the practice was due to an
extension of voting hours and the utilization of voting machines at polling places, which
made it no longer necessary to provide the workers with time off to vote. Torrington
Co. v. Metal Prods. Workers, 362 F.2d 677, 678 (2d Cir. 1966).
2. The agreement also contained a narrow arbitration provision. Therefore, the
union chose to file a complaint with the National Labor Relations Board charging that
the voting policy change constituted an unfair labor practice. This charge was later
dropped, however, and the complaint was dismissed by the Board. 362 F.2d at 678.
3. The union's original written demands included the voting benefit, but its later
written proposals omitted it. No agreement was reached by the time the existing contract expired and a long strike ensued which lasted through election day. Employees who
worked throughout the duration of the strike were not given paid time off to vote.
Ibid.
1 4. Portions of Article V of the agreement included:
"Section 1.-If a grievance is not settled after it has been processed through the three
[grievance steps] ...it may be submitted to arbitration. ...
"Section 3.-The arbitrator shall be bound by and must comply with all of the terms
of this agreement and he shall have no power to add to, delete from, or modify, in any
way, any of the provisions of this agreement.
"Section 4.-The decision of the arbitrator shall be binding on both parties during the
life of this agreement unless the same is contrary, in any way,-to law." Id. n.2.
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found that the dispute was arbitrable, that the voting benefit was a
firmly established practice, and that since the company had the
burden of changing such a policy only through negotiation with the
union, the parties had not agreed to the change. Consequently, he
made an award granting the voting benefit to the employees. 5 The
company successfully petitioned the district court to vacate the award 6
on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. On appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held, affirmed. The
question of an arbitrator's authority to expand the terms of a collective agreement on the basis of a prior practice of a party to the agreement is subject to judicial review, and the arbitrator's decision that
he has such authority should not be accepted where the reviewing
court can clearly perceive that he has derived it from sources outside
the collective bargaining agreement. Torrington.Cqv. ifetal Products
Workers, 362 F.2d 677 (2d Cir. 1966).
Arbitration clauses are commonly included in collective bargaining
agreements as a means of settling grievance disputes arising from
inherent ambiguities in the collective agreement.7 Prior to 1960, the
controversy over jurisdiction of the arbitrator with respect to the
collective bargaining agreement centered around two problems-the
arbitrability of the issues and the extent of the contractual authority
vested in the arbitrator to make awards. United Steelworkers i .
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.8 settled one aspect of the controversy
by holding that a grievance is arbitrable "unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute."9 At the same time,
5. "Employees who took time off to vote on November 3, 1964 [new contract] shall
be paid up to a maximum of one hour and all other employees who worked during
the election hours on that Election Day and who were paid this benefit on November 6,
1962 [old contract] shall be paid for the same amount of time off for Election Day
1964 as they received for Election Day 1962." The Torrington Co., 45 Lab. Arb. 353,
357 (1965).
6. Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
7, HAYs, LABoR ARBrrRATION, A DtssmETiNG ViEw 13, 14 (1966). Labor arbitration
has been defined as ". . . the submission for determination by a third party of a dispute
arising under a collective agreement." Ibid.
8. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
9. 363 U.S. at 582-83. See also United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S.
564 (1960) (even a frivolous claim is arbitable); New Bedford Defense Prods. Div, v.
Local 1113, UAW, 258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958) (issue arbitrable even though it
could be correctly decided only one way). Several subsequent cases have indicated
that arbitration occupies a preferred position in the settlement of industrial disputes
in order to promote harmony between labor and management. Arbitration is preferred
to the extent that the dispute is arbitrable even where the collective bargaining agreement is silent concerning the subject matter in controversy. See Local 702, Int'l
Bd. of Elec. Workers v. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 324 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1963)
(gas discount to company workers); Arkansas-Louisiana Gas Co. v. Local 5-283, Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers, 320 F.2d 62 (10th Cir. 1963) (use of non-union supervisory
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United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.10 broadened

the arbitrator's authority to make awards by holding that while an
arbitrator must draw the essence of his award from the collective
bargaining agreement, he could 'look for guidance from many
sources"'1 in interpreting and applying the agreement to the dispute:
Nevertheless, the arbitrators were cautioned not to dispense their own
brand of industrial justice.' 2 In following these broad guidelines,
courts seem to uphold arbitration awards unless the arbitrator was
not justified in deviating from the plain mandate of the agreement.13
Where ambiguities exist due to the necessarily broad and general
language of the agreement, arbitrators frequently look to such criteria
as the "common law of the shop" 14 upon which to base their awards.
Past practice is often helpful in fashioning awards where the terms
of the agreement are ambiguous, 15 but past practice has occasionally
been extended to include in the agreement implied conditions where
none previously existed. 16 An examination of arbitration awards
reveals that the criteria used by arbitrators to determine whether
past practice has become a part of the collective bargaining agreement
include: (1) the length of time the practice has been established,
(2) the origin and continuity of the practice, (3) the relation of
the practice to a major condition of employment, (4) reliance by
employees on a continuation of the practice, (5) the nature of absolute
and unconditional privileges, and (6) the percentage of employees
personnel to perform work); Harris Structural Steel Co. v. Local 3682, United Steelworkers, 298 F.2d 363 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 851 (1962) (Christmas
bonuses). Contractual clauses that exclude matters from arbitration have been strictly
construed. See IUE v. General Elec. Co., 332 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 928 (1964) (grievance arbitrable unless clearly excluded); Local 12298, UMW
v. Bridgeport Gas Co., 328 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1964) (exclusionary clause must be clear
and unambiguous); O'Malley v. Wilshire Oil Co., 59 Cal. 2d 587, 381 P.2d 188 (1963)
(exclusion must be manifest).
10. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
11. 363 U.S. at 597.
12. See ibid.
13. E.g., H. K. Porter Co. v. United Saw, File & Steel Prod. Workers, 333 F.2d
596 (3d Cir. 1964) (deviation from pension plan requirements justified due to past
practice of not requiring strict compliance). But cf. Local 784, Truck Drivers & Helpers
v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562 (8th Cir. 1964) (arbitrator exceeded his authority
by ruling that contract provision was too severe).
14. Wilson H. Lee Co. v. Local 74, New Haven Printing Pressmen, 248 F. Supp
289, 290 (D. Conn. 1965). See generally Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72
HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1959).
15. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 37 Lab. Arb. 375 (1961).
16. Elberta Crate & Box Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 228 (1959) (past practice of lunch period
became part of contract); California Cotton Mills Co., 14 Lab. Arb. 377 (1950) (past
practice concerning layoff became part of contract). This tends to encroach in the
area thought by management to be legitimate functions of management and serves as
a source of dissatisfaction with arbitration awards and appeals to the courts. See
generally HAys, op. cit. supra note 7, at 20-21; Lowden, Labor Arbitration Clauses:
Draftsmanship Avoids Litigation, 43 VA. L. REv. 197, 208 (1957).
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involved.'7 As a general rule judicial review of arbitration awards 18
is limited to an examination of the arbitrator's jurisdiction to arbitrate
the dispute and his authority to fashion and render an award, thus
precluding a judicial examination of the merits. 19 The third case in the
Steelworkers "trilogy," United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co.,2 0
stressed the limited function of the judiciary in labor arbitration cases
by holding that a court is restricted to ascertaining whether the claim
made by the party seeking arbitration is governed by the contract.2 '
All questions of contract interpretation should be left to the arbitrator,
and the courts were told that they had no business weighing the
merits of a dispute or seeking equity in a claim.22 Thus, while both
interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement
are within the province of the arbitrator, his authority to fashion
awards is subject to the stipulated contractual limitations despite a
lack of available alternative remedies under the contract.2 Consequently, to give effect to the intention of the parties as manifested in
the agreement, and at the same time to restrain the arbitrator from
performing a legislative function, many collective agreements contain
arbitration clauses restricting the arbitrator to interpreting its terms.2 4
While observing that the dispute in the instant case was arbitrable
and that the voting benefit was an established prior practice, the
court viewed the collective bargaining agreement as a contract that
affirmatively stated the specific restraints upon the arbitrator's freedom
of action. The majority drew on Enterprise Wheel 25 to support its
holding that judicial review of arbitration awards is authorized to
determine whether the arbitrator has exceeded the limits of his contractual authority in fashioning the award. Having determined that
judicial review was so authorized, the court looked to the contract
itself, the negotiations leading to its formulation, and the application
17. Jacob Rupert, 35 Lab. Arb. 503 (1960) (criteria applied to determine binding
effect of past practice); Telemental Prods., Inc., 33 Lab. Arb. 139 (1959) (absolute and
unconditional privileges); Ingalls Iron Works Co., 32 Lab. Arb. 960 (1959) (duration
of uninterrupted past practice); Elberta Crate Box Co., supra note 16 (factors should
be considered). Compare Columbus Auto Parts Co., 36 Lab. Arb. 166 (1961) (unilaterally established practice could be unilaterally discontinued).
18. Under the Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964).
19. Ficek v. Southern Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 988
(1964). But see HAYs, op. cit. supra note 7, at 79. "Arbitration cannot properly call
upon the courts to act as rubber stamps for whatever arbitrators may do. If the processes of the courts are to be available to enforce arbitration, then courts must examine
and pass upon what it is that they are enforcing." Ibid.
20. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
21. 363 U.S. at 567-68.
22. 363 U.S. at 568.
23. Carey v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1963).
24. Id. at 507.
25. 363 U.S. at 597.
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of the contract to the dispute. It concluded that the arbitrator
misinterpreted the contract by reading into it a past practice which
was discussed during negotiations but omitted from the contract. 20
The court expressly rejected the arbitrator's opinion that the burden
of obtaining an express contract provision reflecting the new voting
policy was on the company and held that the award upholding the
voting benefit was beyond the scope of the arbitrator's authority.
Judge Feinberg, in a dissenting opinion, viewed the court's decision
as a judicial examination of the merits of the dispute under the
new guise 27 of determining the extent of the arbitrator's authority to
fashion an award. He felt that the scope of review should be limited
to determining whether the award in fact drew "its essence from the
collective bargaining agreement" and "whether the arbitrator's words
manifest an infidelity to this obligation." (Emphasis added.)
The Steelworkers trilogy lends support to both sides of the issue as
presented to the instant court. Since the voting benefit was not
included in the collective bargaining agreement, even after consideration during the bargaining process, it follows that an award upholding the benefit could not be considered as "drawing its essence
from" the agreement. Yet, the arbitrator concluded that past practice
placed the voting benefit within the purview of the collective agreement. An examination of the correctness of this interpretation requires
a judicial inquiry which comes dangerously close to an examination of
the merits of the dispute, an act prohibited under the trilogy. While
it is generally recognized that past practice is useful in filling in the
detailsm of a collective bargaining agreement, it is an inappropriate
vehicle for amending the contract itself. However, where interpretation ends and amendment begins often depends upon the extent of
the arbitrator's authority under the agreement. Consequently, effective judicial review may often require a comprehensive judicial inquir
into the "essence" of the collective bargaining agreement. But since
Enterprise Wheel and American stressed the limited function of the
26. The court held that the union was attempting
to add to the contract a benefit
that it did not think of sufficient importance during negotiations to insist on having it
included in the terms of the contract. 362 F.2d at 682.
27. The old attempts to obtain judicial review of the merits were made on the basis
of arbitrability. The issues were alleged to be so clear that they were not arbitrable.
362 F.2d at 684. The Warrior decision settled this area of contention. 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
28. "Gaps may be left to be filled in by reference to the practices of the particular
industry and of the various shops covered by the agreement." 363 U.S. at 580.
29. "The arbitrator . . . does not have such superior authority to impose implied
conditions. The implications which he may find are only those which may reasonably
be inferred from some term of the agreement." Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law
in Labor Relations, 68 HIAv. L. REv. 999, 1012 (1955).
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courts in the settlement of labor disputes 0 and cautioned against a
judicial usurpation of the arbitrator's function, the courts would seem
precluded from an in-depth examination of the agreement, the circumstances attending its formulation, and the claims of the disputants.
However, the broad guidelines established by the Steelworkers cases
do not in fact define the limits on judicial inquiry where a court is
faced with distinguishing between "interpretation of" and "addition
to" a collective bargaining agreement, and it seems obvious that where
the disputed benefit is not mentioned in the contract, some knowledge
of the attending circumstances and the rationale of the arbitrator
must be obtained by the court before it can determine if the abritrator
exceeded his authority. Undoubtedly the broad policy of limitation
enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers cases serves as
a benchmark from which lower courts must adjust the scope of their
review. The implication that the "essence" and "fidelity" tests require
no more than a mechanical application to the review of arbitration
awards indicates that the instant case represents an outer limit of
the scope of judicial review. Deeper inquiry into matters considered
and weighed by the arbitrator could have a substantial effect on
future judicial review in that more restrictive standards may be forthcoming if lower courts expand their review power to examine the
merits of an arbitrated dispute.
30. Since the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. § 101 (1964),
it has been the labor policy of the United States that the courts should not intervene
in the settlement of labor disputes.

Labor Relations-Federal Preemption of Defamation
Suits Arising in Course of Organizational Campaign,
A company manager filed suit against a union in a federal district
court,' charging that leaflets circulated by the union during the
organizational campaign in plaintiff's plant defamed him under -state
law. The complaint alleged neither malice nor actual or special
damages, but proceeded on the theory that the leaflets were libelous
per se. 2 The district court dismissed the complaint On the ground
1. Plaintiff sued in a federal court on the basis of diversity of citizenship. The cause
of action is based upon state law.
2. "The respondents had circulated among the employees leaflets which stated inter
alia:
'(7) Now we find out that Pinkerton's has had a large volume of work in Saginaw
they have had it for years.
'United Plant Guard Workers now has evidence
'A. That Pinkerton has 10 jobs in Saginaw, Michigan.
'B. Employing 52 men.
'C. Some of these jobs are 10 yrs. 'oldl
'(8) Make you feel kind sick & foolish. '
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that an action for defamation arising out of a labor dispute is arguably
subject to the National Labor Relations Board's exclusive jurisdiction
as defined in the National Labor Relations Act.3 The Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed and on certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court, held, reversed. The NLRA does not forbid the use
of state remedies 4 for the redress of defamation arising in the course
of a union organizational campaign where the complainant pleads and
proves malice and actual damage. Linn v. Local 114, United Plant
Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53 (1966).5

The leading Supreme Court decisions on the question of preemption, though not dealing exclusively with tortious actions, are Garner,6
Laburnum7 Russell,8 and Garmon II. In Garner a Pennsylvania court
held that the state court lacked jurisdiction to grant an injunction
against picketing by a union attempting to enlist company employees.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed,' 0 holding that a conflict
of remedies (i.e., injunction in state court versus a finding of unfair
labor practice under NLRA), even though addressed to different rights
(i.e., the state's right to maintain peace as opposed to the union's
right to organize and peacefully picket under NLRA), was sufficient
to bring the supremacy clause into play and preempt the field for the
NLRB. 11 The Laburnum case, on the other hand, held that tortious
injury inflicted during violent union activity would support a cause
of action in a state court since Congress had not prescribed another
procedure for dealing with this injury, and since the state had a
"(9) The men in Saginaw were deprived of the right to vote in three NLRB
elections. Their names were not summitted [sic]. These guards were voted into the
Union in 19591 These Pinkerton guards were robbed of pay increases. The Pinkerton
managers were lying to us-all the time the contract was in effect. No doubt the
Saginaw men will file criminal charges. Somebody may go to Jaill "' Linn v. Local
114, United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. 53, 56 (1966).
3. 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (1964).
4. This implies that a similar action brought in a state court would be allowed,
as a federal court sitting in diversity cases acts as another state court.
5. Because the petitioner here did not plead malice or actual injury, his petition
was ultimately sent back for further proceedings below.
6. Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953), 54 CoLm. L. REv.
997 (1954), 29 NoTmE D4mr LA-w. 495 (1954), 7 VA-'D. L. 1yEv. 422 (1954).
7. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1954), 35
B.U.L. 11;v. 193 (1955), 40 COnNELL L.Q. 156 (1954), 6 HAsuNcs L.J. 97 (1954),
29 TuL. L. REv. 155 (1954).
8. UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958), 47 GEo. L.J. 189, J.Pun. L. 498, 61
W. VA. L. REv. 67, 68 YALE L.J. 308.
9. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), 58 Micf. L.
REv. 288, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 784, 13 VAND. L. REv. 416.
10. Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
11. "To the extent that the private right may conflict with the public one, the
former is superseded. To the extent that public interest is found to require official
enforcement instead of private initiative, the latter will ordinarily be excluded." Id.
at 501.
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"compelling interest" in maintaining peace.' 2 Here the remedies were
said to complement one another. Russell, also involving violence and
the state's interest in maintaining civil peace, followed Laburnum in
holding that the state had jurisdiction. The rationale was that the
conduct of the union was not arguably protected by federal law and
that conflict between federal and state law arises only where the
conduct of the defendant union may be within the area protected
by Congress. 13 In 1959, the Supreme Court decided Garmon II which
undertook to provide a test for future determinations of federal
jurisdiction over causes of action arising from labor disputes. In an
earlier case between the same parties (Garmon I), the Court had held
that the Board's refusal to exercise its jurisdiction in a matter over
which it had exclusive jurisdiction did not permit state action to
fill the void. 14 On remand, the state court found that, since the case
involved a tort action, the state court had jurisdiction and the Board
was not competent to decide the dispute. 1 5 The decision was appealed
and came before the Supreme Court a second time. In rejecting the
reasoning of the California court, the Supreme Court noted two
exceptions to the broad preemption of jurisdiction over labor disputes
by the NLRB: (1) where the activity reached deeply rooted local
feelings and responsibility; and (2) where the activity was merely a
peripheral concern of the NLRA. In its attempt to provide a test to
be applied in future preemption cases, the Court stated: "When an
activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the states as well
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference
12. The Court phrased it: "To the extent . . . that Congress has not prescribed
procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct already committed,
there is no ground for concluding that existing criminal penalties or liabilities for
tortious conduct have been eliminated." United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum
Constr. Co., 347 U.S. at 665.
13. The Chief Justice, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, dissented in this case on
policy grounds. Mr. Justice Black was not present. "The Laburnum and Russell cases
sustained state judgments awarding damages to an employer and an individual employee
who suffered economic losses as a result of union violence which was an unfair labor
practice under section 8(b)(1). Under one view these cases were simply illustrations
of the principle that the states are free to deal with the violence despite the applicability
of the NLRA. Under another view, which had ample support in both opinions, the
Laburnum and Russell cases stood for the proposition that although the states may
not grant preventive relief against conduct prohibited by the NLRA, they may
nonetheless award a compensatory remedy for tortious conduct already completed.
A few state courts extended this interpretation to awards of damages for losses suffered
as a result of protected union activities . . . . All nine justices agreed [in Garmon]
that a state may not award damages to an employer for losses suffered as a result of
conduct which is protected by section 7 or which the NLRB might reasonably consider
protected by section 7." Cox, Major Decisions of the Supreme Court October Term
1958, 1959 A.B.A. PRocEEinGs, SECEON OF LABor RELATIONS LAw 23, 24.
14. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 27 (1957).
15. Garmon v. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, 49 Cal. 2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958).
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with national policy is to be averted." 16 The fact that the NLRB

could not give the same remedy that otherwise would be available in
a state court was immaterial. Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by three
members of the Court concurred specially on the narrow ground that
in this case the activity in question was arguably subject to the

exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB and therefore the state court could
not act until the NLRB had determined whether or not the activity
in question was protected. He concluded that "[I]n instances in which
the Board declines to exercise its jurisdiction, the states are entirely
deprived of power to afford any relief." 7 Although the decision in

Garmon II was intended to delineate more clearly the limits of

preemption, 8 subsequent decisions of various courts evidenced continued confusion in the area. 19
Faced with the familiar problem of preemption, the majority of the
Court in Linn first noted that the applicable test is the one set out
in Garmon 11.20 It then pointed out that the Board's concern with the
use of language is limited to determining if the language is coercive
or misleading with respect to the employee's right to exercise a truly

free choice in Board conducted elections, 21 while the state's concern

is addressed to the issue of defamation of one of its citizens and the
redressing of that wrong.22 Relying upon this distinction, the majority
concluded that the state had a compelling interest in the settlement
of the dispute, and that the remedy provided by the state was not at
cross purposes" with federal policy. Furthermore, finding the defama16. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Carmon, 359 U.S. at 245.
17. Id. at 253.
18. "Indeed, when applied other than to protect unions in their use of economic
force from state restrictions, the Garmon formula may impale us on the thorns."
Summers, Decisions of the Supreme Court 1962 Term, 1963 A.B.A. PnocEe ntms,
SECnoN OF LABOR RLATIoNS LA-w 1, 3.
19. For a summary of this situation see Report of the Committee on Development of
Law Under the National Labor Relations Act, 1965 A.B.A. PROCEEDINCS, SECTION OF
LAnon RELATIONS LAW, 15, 119-20. For a case holding that the NLRA should not be
a shield for tortious conduct which is at most a peripheral concern of the NLRB see
Brantley v. Devereaux, 237 F. Supp. 156 (E.D.S.C. 1965), where the court distinguishes cases on grounds that persons here involved are individuals and that this
was a bargaining session and not an organizational campaign. Meyers v. Local 107,
Teamsters Union, 416 Pa. 401, 206 A.2d 382 (1965) (two justices dissenting), a case
cited by the majority, is very much like Linn and follows the same reasoning. For a
well written case following the reasoning of the minority opinions in Linn, see Blum
v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 42 N.J. 389, 201 A.2d 46 (1964) (three justices
dissenting). For a very recent case, see Westmoreland v. Gordons Transp., Inc.,
61 L.R.R.M. 2699 (La. Cir. Ct. 1966).
20. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
21. Linn v. Local 114, United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. at 63.
22. Id. at 64. These safeguards are based on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964). The definition of malice which is stated in Linn is ". . . knowledge
of their falsity or with reckless .disregard of whether they were true or false.
383 U.S..at 65.
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tion issue to be peripheral to the administration of the NLRA, the
Court brought Linn within the second of the Garmon exceptions and
reversed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint. Mr. Justice
Black dissenting, 3 stated that Congress knew labor disputes tend to
involve vituperative exchanges and had not intended to purify these
exchanges, but only to free them so that disputes could be peacefully
settled. He concluded that the present decision was in conflict with
the basic purposes of the NLRA and would lead industrial relations
back to the "law of the jungle." Mr. Justice Fortas, joined by Mr. Chief
Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas, also dissented, 24 expressing
concern that the decision of the majority would be disruptive of the
painfully achieved stability in industrial relations.
The Court's decision, though welcomed with praise in quarters
representing management,25 is neither as strong 26 nor as well reasoned
as it might have been. For example, the contention that the distinction between a cause of action for libel and one for unfair labor
practice keeps their respective remedies from conflicting is contrary
to the reasoning in Garnerthat remedies which are sanctions for the
same act are inevitably in conflict.2 Moreover, reliance upon the
argument that if jurisdiction over libel claims is denied to state courts,
plaintiffs will be left remediless (an argument which the rationale
of Laburnum would seem to support)2 directly conflicts with the
Court's position in Garmon II that such a result is not relevant to
the claim of jurisdiction.2 9 The most serious objection to the majority
opinion, however, is based upon the policy considerations expressed
in the minority opinions. Suits of this nature may well be used to
harass the union-such harassment is in direct conflict with the basic
policy of maintaining peace in industrial relations. The majority's
suggestion that requiring the plaintiff to plead and prove both malice
23. Id. at 67.
24. Id. at 69.
25. Wall Street Journal, March 2, 1966, p. 8, cols. 1 & 2; Robert C. Isaacs (1966
N.Y.U. Conference on Labor Law) 61 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA News & Background,
April 25, 1966).
26. However the five-to-four split of the Court, its reservations about deciding anew,
and its failure to explain precisely where courts below erred are weak points. On the
other hand, the fact that this decision was rendered with a very weak factual situation
before the Court, may indicate that it is in fact a very strong opinion which marks
the beginning of a trend to restrict the area preempted 'by Congress.
27. Garner v. Local 776, Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. at 478-79. A possible distinction
however is that in Garner, the remedies would necessarily conflict, whereas here they
could in fact be supplemental.
28. United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Co., 347 U.S. at 663-64. The
reasoning of Laburnum would seem to support the opinion of the majority in that one
factor in their decision was that Congress had provided no procedure for dealing with
situations of the kind before the Court.
29. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 246. -
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and actual damage will avoid the dangers of spurious suits does not
answer the argument that the mere initiation or threat of such suits
may disrupt the stability of industrial relations. Finally, there are two
minor points which weaken the majority opinion: (1) an indication
of pique that labor unions are not assuming adult responsibilities now

that they have come of age;30 and (2) the statement that if experience
shall indicate its desirability, the Court will be free to reconsider its
holding in this case. 31 While it is difficult to draw any meaningful
inferences from the Court's approach in the instant case, it may at
least be said that the question of jurisdiction over defamation suits
arising in the course of labor disputes is now resolved in favor of
state power in so far as one five-to-four decision can settle it.32

State and Local Taxation-Economic Exploitation
Sufficient Connection To Require Non-Resident
Seller To Collect Use Tax
Defendant, a non-resident mail order vendor, was sued under an
Illinois Use Tax provision, which required retailers to collect a use
tax for Illinois if they solicited orders within the state by means of

catalogues or other advertising.' Defendant contended that the due

process clauses of the Illinois2 and federal 3 constitutions 4 prohibited

30. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955). See also Local 20,
Teamsters Union v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
31. Linn v. Local 114, United Plant Guard Workers, 383 U.S. at 63.
32. Subsequent to the decision in Linn, a United States Court of Appeals held statements made during a grievance hearing to be absolutely privileged, citing the policy
of industrial peace as recognized in Linn as a ground for its holding. This would tend
to show that at least one circuit is holding to the traditional position of privilege
and is giving effect to the policy of the Linn dissenters though the language is
couched in terms of the majority's recognition of the policy of preserving peace. General
Motors Corp. v. Mendicki, 54 CCH LAB. GAS. ff 11488 (10th Cir. 1966).
1. The Illinois Use Tax Law, which became effective in 1955, imposes a tax "upon
the privilege of using in this State tangible personal property purchased at retail . . .
from a retailer." The tax is to be collected by retailers "maintaining a place of business
in this State .... " ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.3 (1961). The constitutionality
of this statute was confirmed in Turner v. Wright, 11 Ill. 2d 161, 142 N.E.2d 84,
appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 65 (1957). The original statute was amended in 1961 to
include in the definition of retailers maintaining a place of business in the state, any
retailer "Engaging in soliciting orders within this State from users by means of
catalogues or other advertising, whether such orders are received or accepted within
or without this State." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 120, § 439.2 (1963).
2. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law." ILL. CONsT. art. II, § 2. Presumably, the court was discussing this section at
the same time it was speaking of the due process clause of the federal constitution.
3. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. Defendant also relied on the negative implications of the commerce clause,
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Illinois from requiring defendant to collect the tax because its only
connection with the state was the regular mailing of advertisements 6
to its Illinois customers. Defendant also claimed that Illinois could
not exercise in personam jurisdiction over it to enforce liability without
violating the due process clauses of both state and federal constitutionsZ Summary judgment was entered against the 'defendant by the
Circuit Court of Cook County, after defendant appeared specially to
contest jurisdiction. On appeal to the Supreme Court of Illinois, held,
affirmed. The economic exploitation of a local consumer market
through continuous mail order solicitation is constitutionally sufficient
both to impose and enforce liabilty on a non-resident corporation to
collect a local use tax. Department of Revenue v. National Bellas
Hess, Inc., 34 Ill. 2d 164, 214 N.E.2d 755 (1966), Sup. Ct. prob. juris
noted, 87 U.S. 58 (1966).
"The Congress shall have power . . . to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian tribes .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
3. This objection was not discussed in the opinion, but probably for the reason that
use taxes, even with a burden of collection, are levied on the in-state use of property.
As such, interstate commerce has ended. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S.
577 (1937) (use tax upheld against commerce clause objection).
5. Defendant was incorporated in Delaware, and was qualified to do business only
in Delaware and Missouri. Its only plant was located in Missouri, from which it did
all mailing of advertisements, accepting of orders, shipping of goods, and receiving
of customer payments. The company owned no real or personal property in Illinois,
and did not have within the state any agent, salesman, or other representative to
sell or take orders, deliver merchandise, accept payments or service merchandise.
Further, defendant did no advertising through Illinois newspapers, billboards, radio
or television. Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., 34 III. 2d 164,
214 N.E.2d 755, 756-57 (1966).
6. The advertising which defendant sent into Illinois annually consisted of two main
catalogues and a number of intermediate smaller sales books or flyers. Defendant
mailed the catalogues to a restricted list of customers, which contained 5,000,000
names when acquired in 1932, and which was kept current with active and recent
customers. The flyers were mailed to a larger group of potential customers, occasionally
in bulk addressed to "occupant" or enclosed with ordered goods. Id. at
_
214
N.E.2d at 756.
7. Defendant made other contentions in the supreme court, each of which was
summarily dismissed. First, it argued that the Illinois Use Tax was actually a tax
on the out-of-state collector, and not on the in-state user of the purchased goods. The
court, however, pointed to the Scripto case, infra note 13, in which a similar burden
on the collector was sustained because it arose when the seller failed to collect the tax
from the consumer. 34 Ill. 2d at
_
214 N.E.2d at 760.
Second, defendant contended that the Illinois statute providing for substituted service
of process did not use a reasonable method of notification. The statute, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 120, § 439.113 (1961), required that a true and certified copy of process
or notice be sent to the taxpayer by registered or certified mail at its last known
place of business. Since almost an identical statute was upheld in International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, infra note 19, the Illinois statute was deemed to give sufficient
notice. 34 Ill. 2d at _,
214 N.E.2d at 762.
Two issues of statutory interpretation were also raised by defendant. The service
of process statute allegedly did not apply because defendant had not "accepted" the
privilege of maintaining a place of business in the state as required by the statute.
However, the court pointed out that the statute applies to defendant since by the
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A state may constitutionally impose and enforce tax liability upon
a non-resident only if the non-resident has sufficient contacts with
the taxing state. Due process requires "some definite link, some

minimum connection, between a state and the person, property or

transaction it seeks to tax."8 It is settled that a state may require a

non-resident seller who has submitted to state jurisdiction to collect
a use tax on goods destined for the taxing state.9 Thus, sufficient

contacts to give the state court jurisdiction to impose and enforce
liability exist where a seller has qualified to do business within the
state, 10 or does business there from offices located in the state."
Jurisdiction is more questionable, however, where the non-resident
is not qualified to do business in the taxing state, has no personal or
real property there, and has no employees working out of offices in
the state. This situation arose in General Trading Co. v. Tax Com-

mission,12 where the seller's only contact with the taxing state was
through traveling salesmen. The Supreme Court found this connection
sufficient to give the state jurisdiction to impose liability for the use
tax. Since that decision, the Supreme Court has held similar solicita13
tion by independent brokers is equally sufficient for jurisdiction.
terms of the statute defendant does maintain a place of business within the state.
Whether the privilege was extended by Illinois, or "accepted" by the retailer, was
declared academic. Ibid. Defendant also noted that the service of process statute
provided for notice to the "taxpayer," and that since it was only the "collector," it was
not within the scope of the statute. It should be pointed out that defendant's position
here is contrary to that taken at the outset-that the tax was on the collector, not the
user. The supreme court dismissed this argument after stating that service of process
was to apply to persons who have incurred liability under the statute. The statute also
specifically stated that it applies to non-resident vendors, so that "taxpayer" was
being used in a generic, rather than a technical, manner. Id. at _
, 214 N.E.2d at
762-63.
Other arguments posed by amici curiae and the defendant concerned equal protection of the laws (dismissed for lack of proof concerning credit sales); sales for
resale (dismissed since none were revealed in the record); absence of personal
signature on the verification of the complaint (unnecessary under ILL. Riv. STAT. ch.
110, § 35 (1961)); entry of summary judgment since genuine issues of fact were
stated (dismissed because no such issues were stated by defendant or revealed by
the record); and lack of signatures on two affidavits (unnecessary because no genuine
issue of fact was present). Id. at
-,
214 N.E.2d at 763.
8. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344-45 (1954).
9. See Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, (1941); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306
U.S. 62 (1939); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86 (1934). See generally
HARTMAN, STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE Co-,fmEcE 172-74 (1953); RESTATEMENT
(SEcOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 90 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956).
10. The out-of-state sellers were qualified to do business in the taxing states in
Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. at 373; Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
312 U.S. at 362; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. at 91.
11. In-state offices existed in Nelson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 312 U.S. at 374;
Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. at 362, Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher,
306 U.S. at 64-65; Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U.S. at 91.
12. 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
13. Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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Whether performed by salesmen or brokers, however, this solicitation
must be continuous.' 4 The physical presence of agents making only
occasional deliveries of goods has been found to be an insufficient
connection, even where the seller has occasionally mailed circulars
into the taxing state and has regularly purchased newspaper, radio,
and television advertising that reach the taxing state. 15 These decisions
have been primarily concerned with the power of a state to impose
tax liability, that is, the state's substantive law jurisdiction. 16 The
power of a state to enforce tax liability, that is, its judicial jurisdiction, 17 has generally been handled summarily once the power to impose
the tax has been established. 8 Other decisions, therefore, must be
reviewed to determine what constitutes sufficient connections with a
taxing state for purposes of judicial jurisdiction. In International
Shoe Co. v. Washington,'9 the Supreme Court held that for judicial
jurisdiction purposes due process requires certain "minimum contacts"
with the forum by the non-resident such that maintenance of the
suit will not offend the "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."20 There the contacts consisted of continuous solicitation by
traveling salesmen, a situation where the judicial jurisdiction problem
was not dealt with because the defendant taxpayer had voluntarily
14. See id. at 212 ("regular, systematic displaying"); Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland,
347 U.S. at 346-47 ("continuous local solicitation" and "active and aggressive opera-

tion").
15. Miller Bros. v. Maryland, supra note 8.
16. Substantive law jurisdiction is the permissible range within which a state may
create legal rights and duties. The term "substantive" jurisdiction is preferred to
"legislative" jurisdiction, which is used m the RESTATEmENT (SEcoND), CONFLICT OF
LA-ws § 43 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956), because this type of jurisdiction includes both
statutes and common law. See also CHEATHAM, PROBLMNS AND METHODS IN CONFLICT
OF LAws 264-71 (1960).
17. Judicial jurisdiction means the extent to which a state's court may render valid
judgments. This type of jurisdiction is discussed in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 74-117 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956). See also CsHEATH
, op.
cit. supra note 16.
18. In the early cases in which property was owned in the state or the foreign
corporation was qualified to do business, there was little need to discuss judicial
jurisdiction. Discussing the Monamotor case, one writer described the "jump" from
constitutional taxability to constitutional collectibility made there (292 U.S. at 95)
as the precedent later used to make "short shrift" of the objection to collectibility.
HAnTiAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 173. Collectibility became significant only in the
later cases with less obvious physical contacts in the taxing state. In General Trading,
however, the issue was not raised because the taxpayer voluntarily submitted itself
to the court's jurisdiction. See note 21 infra. In Miller Bros., the Court never reached
the issue, since substantive jurisdiction was found lacking. In Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,
the out-of-state vendor brought suit in the taxing state to contest the constitutionality
of the tax. 105 So. 2d 775 (1958), aff'd, 362 U.S. 207 (1960). Defendant correctly
stated in the instant case, therefore, that the issue of judicial jurisdiction had not been
raised, at lease effectively, in any of the earlier use tax collection cases. Department
of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, Inc., supra note 5, at
-,
214 N.E.2d at 760.
19. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
20. Id. at 316.
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appeared and filed an answer, 21 almost identical to the earlier case of
General Trading. Solicitation need not be continuous to establish
judicial jurisdiction, however, as illustrated by McGee v. International
Life Ins. Co.," where the solicitation of a single life insurance policy
satisfied the minimum contacts requirement.23
In the instant case, the Supreme Court of Illinois had first to
determine whether mere solicitation by mail was sufficient to give the
state substantive jurisdiction. After examining the major tax cases
involving the element of solicitation2 4 the court concluded that "continuous local solicitation followed by delivery of ordered goods" was
the most tenuous connection that a non-resident could have and still
be within the substantive jurisdiction of the state.' The court then
declared that defendant's solicitation was within this definition, and
that defendant was therefore subject to the liability imposed.26 The
fact that this solicitation was by mail order catalogues, and not by use
21. General Trading was cited in International Shoe as a precedent for substantive
law jurisdiction. See HAETmAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 175-76. General Trading,
however, was controlling on the issue of substantive law jurisdiction, and was cited
by the Court as such. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 322.
22. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The importance of solicitation as a contact for judicial
jurisdiction was implied in the subsequent case of Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235
(1958). In finding no judicial jurisdiction there, the Court distinguished McGee by
noting that "the record discloses no solicitation . . . in person or by mail" as there
was in McGee. Id. at 251.
23. Judicial jurisdiction can, of course, be achieved through numerous other means.
See HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 176.
24. The earliest case in which solicitation was present was Nelson v. Montgomery
Ward & Co., supra note 9. Substantive jurisdiction there was based on qualification
for doing business in the state, and property and agents there. Some emphasis was
placed, however, on the solicitation of mail orders by the defendant as a "further
fact in this record which makes a reversal ...necessary." Id. at 376.
The solicitation in General Trading was through traveling salesmen in the state.
The continuous nature of their activities was the basis for substantive jurisdiction
(see explanation in Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. at 346), as it was in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 320. The solicitation in Miller Bros., which
was insufficient to give jurisdiction, was distinguished by the Court: "[T]here is a wide
gulf between this type of active and aggressive operation [in General Trading] . . .
and the occasional delivery of goods sold at an out-of-state store with no solicitation
other than the incidental effects of general advertising." 347 U.S. at 347. This general
advertising consisted of regular out-of-state newspaper, radio, and television advertising, as well as occasional sales circulars mailed to in-state customers. Id. at 349-50.
The solicitation in Scripto was similar to that in General Trading, except that it was
performed by independent brokers. 362 U.S. at 209.
25. "In short, 'continuous local solicitation followed by delivery of ordered goods
to the customers' apparently forms a constitutional basis for a 'State's decision to
regard such a rivalry with its local merchants as equivalent to being a local merchant.'
[citation]" Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, supra note 5, at
-, 214
N.E.2d at 759.
26. Id at
-,
214 N.E.2d at 760. It is curious that under these same facts,
Illinois could not constitutionally impose a sales tax on defendant. See MeLeod v. J. E.
Dilworth, 322 U.S. 327 (1944); HARTMAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 174-75.

19661

RECENT CASES

of salesmen, brokers, or local' advertising, was deemed immaterial.27
The court did not, however, base its holding solely upon the solicitation connection. Rather, it declared that this continuous solicitation
was simply the means used for the economic exploitation of the local
consumer market, and that this exploitation was in fact the true
"minimum connection" with the state. 28 The court noted that both
Miller Brothers Co.2 and Scripto30 were based, at least in part, on
this view, which was first espoused by Mr. Justice Rutledge in his
separate opinion in General Trading.31 The court then proceeded to
the question of judicial jurisdiction. Relying on International Shoe,
the court concluded that the same continuous solicitation that provided the requisite "minimum connections" for substantive jurisdiction
was adequate to satisfy the "minimum contacts" necessary for judicial
jurisdiction purposes. Since McGee had sustained judicial jurisdiction
on the basis of a single solicitation, the court saw little difficulty in
finding such jurisdiction over the defendant in the instant case.
The court here was faced with a pattern of continuous solicitation
which would clearly support judicial jurisdiction, but which might not
be sufficient under the due process clause to establish substantive
jurisdiction. The finding of the latter in the instant case may be
interpreted as simply an extension of the idea of continuous solicitation
to the problem of mail order vendors. Under exisiting law the
continuous solicitation by sales representatives, followed by delivery
of the ordered goods, is a minimum connection sufficient for substan27. Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, supra note 5, at __
214
N.E.2d at 759. This step was significant in that physical presence of some agent,

either salesman or broker, was implicitly eliminated as having been a basis of past
holdings. Considering the history of substantive jurisdiction as developed from the
requirement of local real or personal property to that of local representatives, this
step away from physical presence is a significant one.
28. "The important question is whether there is 'exploitation of the consumer
market' by continuous solicitation and not whether the company used local advertising,
salesmen, brokers or catalogues since the vendor will use that type of solicitation
which most effectively and economically exploits the consumer market." Ibid.
29. 347 U.S. at 347; cited in Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, supra
note 5, at
-,
214 N.E.2d at 759.
30. 362 U.S. at 212; cited in Department of Revenue v. National Bellas Hess, supra
note 5, at
, 214 N.E.2d at 759.
31. Mr. Justice Rutledge concurred in General Trading, 322 U.S. at 349, and in
International Harvester Co. v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349 (1944)
and dissented in McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. at 349. He recognized that
"regular, continuous, persistent solicitation has the same economic, and should have
the same legal, consequences as does maintaining an office for soliciting and even
contracting purposes or maintaining a place of business, when the goods actually are
shipped into the state from without for delivery to the particular buyer." Id. at 354.
Employing an economic approach to substantive jurisdiction has received some
support from the profession. See HR-MA
, op. cit. supra note 9, at 178; Note, Sales
and Use Taxes: Collection From Absentee Vendors, 57 HuIAv. L. ryEv. 1086, 1089
(1944).
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tive jurisdiction; and the extension to mail order solicitations does not
seem unreasonable. But the instant case has broader implications.
It is an express recognition that the economic effect of a taxpayer's
connections with the taxing state will determine whether those
connections are constitutionally sufficient to allow a state to exercise
substantive and judicial jurisdiction over him.-2 The court's reliance
on the economic effect of the taxpayer's connection might well have
been precipitated by the court's concern that the continuous solicitation rule would not apply, since that rule could easily be interpreted as requiring some physical presence within the taxing state. 33
Nevertheless, the step toward an economic exploitation standard is
praiseworthy as a realistic approach to the problem of what constitutes
substantive jurisdiction. 34 The Illinois court has apparently determined
that continuous solicitation indicates an economic exploitation of a
consumer market, which will support substantive jurisdiction. A truly
economic approach, however, would probably not produce a standard
which required that the solicitation be "continuous." For example,
sporadic advertising might be particularly exploitative for certain types
of products involving discount sales; concentrated solicitation schemes
over short periods of time might well exploit a local market by
effectively competing with local merchants; and radio, television and
newspaper advertising are undoubtedly as effective as mail order
catalogues in reaching local consumer markets. Thus, under a broad
interpretation of the economic exploitation theory, these "connections"
32. Both the Miller Bros. and Scripto decisions discussed "economic exploitation" as
a contributing factor, but neither found it determinative. In Miller Bros., the Court
first held that the "occasional" delivery of goods and the mere "incidental effects" of
general advertising distinguished the situation before it from that in General Trading.
Only then did the Court add, "Here was no invasion or exploitation of the consumer
market in Maryland." 347 U.S. at 347. Exploitation was apparently another means
of phrasing the earlier ideas.
In Scripto, the Court reiterated the "exploitation" idea in distinguishing Miller Bros.
from General Trading, but seemed to treat exploitation as a separate factor. "Miller
had no solicitors in Maryland; there was no 'exploitation of the consumer market'; no
regular, systematic displaying of its products by catalogues, samples or the like."
362 U.S. at 212. However, the holding in Scripto was based squarely on the General
Trading idea of continuous solicitation, Ibid., with exploitation mentioned only with
regard to the prior decisions.
33. No prior cases sustaining substantive jurisdiction lacked that element. Representation in Scripto was through independent brokers; in General Trading and International Shoe, by traveling salesmen; and in Sears Roebuck, Montgomery Ward, Felt &
Tarrant and Monamotor, by permanent in-state sales personnel.
34. This standard is premised on the idea that a state which provides benefits and
protection to a non-resident has a legitimate interest in taxing the non-resident.
Profit-seeking within a state would seem as reasonable a basis for jurisdiction as the
well-established basis of enjoyment of state highways. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S.
352 (1927) (long-arm motorist statute). For a discussion of this analogy, especially
to the mail order situation, see tAni-NrAN, op. cit. supra note 9, at 178. See also,
Note, supranote 31.
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could greatly expand the taxable base of many states. The policy
favoring exaction of a tribute from the non-resident beneficiary of
the local consumer market must be balanced, however, by the fairness
to the non-resident in subjecting him to tax burdens in numerous
jurisdictions. The seller's intent to reach a particular market might
be a reasonable criterion for determining his tax liability arising from
radio and television solicitation. The logical extension of the economic
approach could be the equalization of the tests for substantive and
judicial jurisdiction. Presently, the test for judicial jurisdiction can
apparently be satisfied by the minimal contact of a single solicitation.3
Since in many cases a single solicitation might well "exploit" a local
consumer market, the merger of the tests, guarded vigorously by the
traditions of fair play and substantial justice, would not seem unreasonable.
35. See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., supra note 22.

